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 II.-405 
PRO SE PERILS: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S 
APPROACH TO SIXTH AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES AFTER GUILTY PLEAS 
Abstract: On August 27, 2019, in United States v. Dewberry, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that defendants who have pleaded guilty 
waive their right to challenge a lower court’s decision precluding them from ex-
ercising their Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. In doing so, the 
Eighth Circuit joined the circuit split about whether the constitutional require-
ments for a valid guilty plea are met when defendants are denied these pro se 
rights. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had previously ad-
dressed this issue, with only the Ninth Circuit holding that a defendant may chal-
lenge the lower court’s denial of his Sixth Amendment right after pleading guilty. 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is preferable to that of 
the other circuits because it expands Sixth Amendment rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
The American legal system has long prided itself on providing criminal 
defendants with every opportunity possible to prove their innocence.1 After all, 
the hallmark of the American criminal justice system is that a defendant is “in-
nocent until proven guilty.”2 For that reason, some courts, such as the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have expanded the rights of criminal 
defendants, particularly those proceeding pro se.3 The American onlooker has 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 724 
(2011) (stating that the American criminal justice system’s presumption of innocence is among the 
most well-known principles in the field of criminal law); François Quintard-Morénas, The Presump-
tion of Innocence in the French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 107, 
108 (2010) (arguing that there is widespread agreement about the importance of the presumption of 
innocence in Anglo-American courts). 
 2 See Eric M. Kubilus, Innocent Until Proven (Hypothetically) Guilty: The Third Circuit Con-
dones the Use of Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals in United States v. Kellogg, 53 VILL. L. REV. 665, 
665–66 (2008) (stating that the presumption of innocence is one of the most recognizable standards of 
the American criminal justice system). The presumption of innocence is a concept that has its roots in 
the biblical book of Deuteronomy. Id. (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895) (not-
ing scholars’ work identifying a presumption of innocence in biblical texts)). As a result of its con-
sistent use over hundreds of years, the presumption is “unquestioned” as a bedrock principle of the 
American criminal justice system. See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453–54 (describing the presumption of 
innocence as imbedded in the foundation of American criminal law). 
 3 See United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 627 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that criminal de-
fendants who pleaded guilty after the court denied their pro se rights during pre-trial proceedings did 
not waive their ability to appeal that denial), overruled on other grounds by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 
U.S. 164 (2008). 
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long viewed the ability of criminal defendants to represent themselves with 
skepticism.4 In spite of this, there are a multitude of reasons why a defendant 
may elect to do so.5 
Part I of this Comment describes the state of the governing law at the time 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Dew-
berry, including the requirements for a valid guilty plea, and the factual and 
procedural background of Dewberry.6 Part II explains the disparate positions 
that the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits took.7 Final-
ly, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is more favorable than that 
of the other circuits because it provides defendants with more protections and 
places a stronger emphasis on the right to challenge constitutional deprivations 
that occurred during trial.8 
I. THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKDROP OF UNITED STATES V. DEWBERRY 
In 2019, in United States v. Dewberry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit became the most recent circuit court to decide whether criminal 
defendants who pleaded guilty may challenge the constitutionality of the lower 
court’s denial of their Sixth Amendment right.9 Section A of this Part reviews 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of 
the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 
485 (1996) (referencing the truism that “he who represents himself has a fool for a client”); Ron Os-
troff, The Pitfalls of Being Your Own Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 1980), https://www.nytimes.com/
1980/02/17/archives/new-jersey-weekly-the-pitfalls-of-being-your-own-laywer.html?searchResult
Position=5 [https://perma.cc/5QVJ-FUWJ] (providing a lawyer’s assessment, based on personal expe-
rience, that it is ill-advised to represent oneself without experience doing so); Somini Sengupta, Ama-
teur Lawyers’ Poor Record; History Is Discouraging for Suspect in a Capital Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 29, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/29/nyregion/amateur-lawyers-poor-record-
history-discouraging-for-suspect-capital-case.html?searchResultPosition=4 [https://perma.cc/Q9QB-
DFPA] (remarking that juries are prone to viewing defendants that represent themselves in a negative 
light). 
 5 See Decker, supra note 4, at 485–87 (providing examples of possible motivations for deciding 
to represent oneself). For example, defendants may decide to proceed pro se because they wish to 
communicate their disregard for authority; they are frustrated as a result of adverse proceedings and 
wish to represent themselves to convey their insubordination; they have resigned themselves to a 
severe and potentially life threatening penalty; they are trying to abuse the court system for personal 
gain; they seek to draw attention to a political message, or they genuinely believe that they can repre-
sent themselves as adequately as a trained attorney. Id. 
 6 See infra notes 9–46 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 47–92 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 93–107 and accompanying text. 
 9 See United States v. Dewberry, 936 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that a criminal de-
fendant waives the right to appeal the denial of his pro se right after he has pleaded guilty), reh’g 
denied en banc, No: 17-1649, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29626 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
2827 (2020); see also Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that, by entering a plea of 
guilty, a criminal defendant’s ability to challenge the denial of his pro se right is foreclosed), reh’g denied 
en banc, No. 10-2183, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23965 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Moussaoui, 591 
F.3d 263, 266–68 (4th Cir. 2010) (articulating the idea that a defendant’s plea is voluntary, and thus 
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the state of the governing law when the Eighth Circuit decided the case, as 
well as the standards of a valid guilty plea.10 Section B discusses the factual 
background of Dewberry.11 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Guilty Pleas  
and Pro Se Rights 
The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants against unwarranted 
intrusions into their life and liberty by instituting procedural safeguards that 
ensure that defendants receive a fair adjudication.12 The right to represent one-
self is not explicitly guaranteed in the text of the Sixth Amendment, but, in 
1975, the Supreme Court read that requirement into the amendment in the 
landmark case of Faretta v. California.13 There, the Court held that implicit in 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees is the elementary right to self-
representation in criminal proceedings.14 
In addition to the mandate that criminal defendants be allowed to repre-
sent themselves, the Constitution also sets forth several requirements for a 
guilty plea to be valid.15 Specifically, a guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent and made with adequate awareness of the circumstances and 
likely results.16 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of 
                                                                                                                           
valid, so long as the defendant had the option of proceeding to trial to rectify any improper denial of 
rights); Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 941 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a defendant who pleads nolo 
contendere relinquishes his right to later claim that the lower court improperly denied his pro se right); 
United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1976) (discussing the notion that a de-
fendant who pleads guilty to secure a more favorable sentence does so in a voluntary manner, and, as 
a result, the defendant cannot later challenge the denial of his right to self-representation). 
 10 See infra notes 12–25 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 26–46 and accompanying text. 
 12 Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 488 (2009). 
 13 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975) (stating that it is apparent from the wording 
of the Sixth Amendment that the Framers of the Constitution intended to imply a right to represent 
oneself); Decker, supra note 4, at 492. 
 14 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. 
 15 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (holding that a guilty plea is unconsti-
tutional if it is not “voluntary” and “intelligent”); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (stating that 
the validity of a guilty plea turns on whether it was a voluntary and intelligent choice), habeas pro-
ceeding at 877 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated by, en banc sub nom., United States v. Unit No. 7 & 
Unit No. 8 of Shop in Grove Condo., 883 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1989), aff’d, Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 
1009 (8th Cir. 1990); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970) (articulating that a guilty plea 
must be made with enough awareness of the pertinent circumstances and probable results to be valid); 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (stating that a defendant’s waiver of constitutional 
rights cannot be valid unless it is knowing and made with sufficient consciousness of the likely result). 
 16 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618; Hill, 474 U.S. at 56; McMann, 397 U.S. at 766; Brady, 397 U.S. at 
748. The Supreme Court has not articulated all of these factors within a single case. See supra note 15 
and accompanying text (outlining Supreme Court cases relevant to the constitutionality of plea re-
quirements). Rather, the Supreme Court has laid down these factors in a multitude of cases throughout 
the past several decades. Supra note 15  and accompanying text. Conversely, many circuit courts have 
articulated these factors in a single, comprehensive test. See Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 798 (2d 
II.-408 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
treating a guilty plea with care due to the forfeiture of rights that it entails.17 
For example, in 2018, in Class v. United States, the Court held that a guilty 
plea does not on its own preclude a defendant from alleging that the statute 
under which the defendant was convicted is unconstitutional.18 Because the 
defendant in Class made constitutional claims that did not directly negate the 
provisions of his plea agreement, his appeal could stand.19 This holding is con-
sistent with the Court’s 1983 holding in Haring v. Prosise that, although a 
guilty plea deprives the defendant of the ability to later contest the admittance 
of unlawfully acquired evidence in the proceedings, the plea does not preclude 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2006) (stating that a guilty plea may stand “only if done voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, 
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); Burket v. Angelo-
ne, 208 F.3d 172, 190 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a constitutionally valid guilty plea must be “volun-
tary and intelligent,” with consideration given to all of the circumstances surrounding the plea); Mat-
thew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that, in addition to voluntary and intelli-
gent, a valid plea must also ensure that the defendant understands its effect); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 
1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a guilty plea has to be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” 
as well as reflective of the defendant’s awareness of all of the options at his disposal because in plead-
ing guilty, the defendant relinquishes many rights), abrogated in part by Cloyd v. State, 302 S.W.3d 
804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). But see United States v. Leyland, 277 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding 
that “conscious relinquishment” of a defendant’s right to later contest double jeopardy is unnecessary 
due to the fact that a guilty plea represents enough ownership of the crime to prove that the defendant 
actually partook in it). Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly require that a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere be voluntary. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2); see Nolo Contendere, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining nolo contendere as a plea that does not techni-
cally admit guilt but also does not contest the charge). The judge is required to directly engage the 
defendant to ensure that the defendant was not coerced into making a guilty plea by force, intimida-
tion, or illicit promises apart from those made in the plea agreement prior to allowing a guilty plea. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
 17 See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 719 n.5 (1948) (stating that courts have traditionally 
treated guilty pleas with significant care). The Court emphasized the responsibility of all courts to 
ensure that the defendant comprehends the circumstances and that the defendant voluntarily entered 
into the terms of the plea. See id. (quoting LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST 
TO APPEAL 300 (1947)). The Court also stated that courts should not allow defendants’ confessions 
that are unsupported by evidence to decide their guilt because there are instances in which innocent 
people might falsely incriminate themselves. See Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 719 n.5 (citing SIR GEORGE 
BOWYER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ENGLAND 355 (Owen Richards ed., 2d 
ed.) (1846)) (emphasizing that defendants should never be found guilty based on a confession alone)). 
 18 Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018). In Class v. United States, which the Su-
preme Court decided in 2018, the government charged the defendant with possessing firearms that the 
authorities found inside of his vehicle parked on the premises of the U.S. Capitol. Id. at 802. Though 
the defendant pleaded guilty and signed a plea agreement acknowledging his waiver of numerous 
constitutional rights, the agreement did not specify whether the defendant could later challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. Id. The Court stated that, because the 
defendant did not relinquish any constitutional claims, he should be allowed to pursue them on appeal. 
Id. at 807. 
 19 See id. at 807 (holding that the waiver the defendant signed at trial did not explicitly or implic-
itly prevent him from pursuing constitutional claims). 
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defendants from bringing other Fourth Amendment complaints separate from 
the original prosecution.20 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also held that the entrance of a 
guilty plea weighs in favor of limiting a defendant’s right to later challenge the 
validity of the lower court proceedings.21 For example, in 1973, in Tollett v. 
Henderson, the Supreme Court held that the relevant question for a court to 
consider in determining whether a defendant can challenge the constitutionali-
ty of the proceedings leading up to a guilty plea is whether the advice counsel 
gave the defendant and the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea were suffi-
cient.22 In doing so, the Court declined to examine whether a latent constitu-
tional defect in the proceedings existed.23 The Court stated that a guilty plea 
that was “voluntarily and intelligently entered” cannot be undone simply be-
cause of the defendant’s lack of awareness of all possible arguments available 
to him.24 Similarly, in 1970, in Brady v. United States, the Court held that a 
guilty plea is voluntary even if it is made as a result of the fear that a jury trial 
might lead to a death sentence.25 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983). In Haring v. Prosise, which the Supreme Court 
decided in 1983, the government charged the defendant with unlawfully “manufacturing a controlled 
substance.” Id. at 308. After pleading guilty, the defendant sought to challenge the constitutionality of 
the search of his apartment that led to the discovery of the components typically used to create the 
illegal substance. Id. 
 21 See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (holding that defendants who have 
pleaded guilty cannot appeal their convictions even if evidence later surfaces demonstrating that the 
grand jury involved in the defendant’s indictment was not constitutionally selected). In 1973, the Su-
preme Court decided Tollett v. Henderson, in which a defendant pleaded guilty to murder at his attorney’s 
urging. Id. at 259. The court sentenced the defendant to ninety-nine years in prison, but the defendant 
sought an appeal several years later, claiming that his plea was the result of undue pressure and that his 
counsel had not aided him effectively. Id. The defendant also claimed that his constitutional rights had 
been eroded because African Americans were kept from serving on the grand jury that indicted him. Id. 
During the proceedings in question, the defendant was only twenty years old and had received only min-
imal education. Id. at 261. The defendant was also unrepresented by counsel when he signed his confes-
sion. Id. Nevertheless, the Court decided that a showing of unconstitutional bias in a grand jury’s assem-
bly does not necessarily allow a defendant who pleaded guilty the benefit of an appellate remedy. Id. at 
266. 
 22 Id. at 266. 
 23 Id. The Court stated that allegations of constitutional infirmity in the lower court proceedings 
can be taken into consideration when assessing the advice given to the defendant by his attorney, but 
the allegations alone do not justify providing an appellate remedy. Id. at 267. 
 24 Id. at 267. The Court emphasized that a defendant who has taken ownership for his role in a 
crime in front of a judge cannot later challenge the constitutionality of the events leading up to his 
guilty plea. Id. 
 25 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749–50 (1970). The Court held that a plea may not be 
coerced by threats of physical danger, but it is acceptable for the defendant to make a strategic choice 
to forego the possibility of a death sentence by pleading guilty. Id. The Court highlighted the fact that, 
in this case, there was no evidence to suggest that the defendant was so fearful of a possible death 
sentence that he could not logically assess the circumstances. Id. The Court quoted Judge Elbert Tut-
tle’s majority opinion, stating that a guilty plea should be upheld unless it is made as a result of intim-
II.-410 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
B. The Facts of United States v. Dewberry 
Kansas City police officers pulled over Andre Dewberry in January 
2015.26 After he stepped out of the vehicle, officers witnessed Dewberry place 
a gun underneath it.27 Shortly thereafter, prosecutors charged Dewberry with 
one count of being a “felon in possession of a firearm.”28 
Although the magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri provided Dewberry with a public defender, Dewberry 
asked to represent himself.29 The magistrate judge eventually allowed Dewber-
ry’s entreaty and assigned Dewberry’s public defender as standby counsel in-
stead.30 Dewberry then requested that the judge provide another attorney.31 The 
magistrate judge denied the motion and ordered Dewberry to choose to either 
(1) proceed pro se; (2) retain new counsel himself; or (3) move for his court-
                                                                                                                           
idation, deceit, or illicit promises on the part of the prosecutor. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United 
States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)). 
 26 United States v. Dewberry, 935 F.3d 803, 804 (8th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied en banc, No. 17-
1649, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29626 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020). 
 27 Id. The officers subsequently discovered and confiscated the gun. Id. 
 28 Id. Dewberry’s possession of a firearm constituted an infraction of two relevant sections of the 
U.S. Code: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) 
(stating that it is illegal for an individual who has been convicted of a crime severe enough to warrant 
a prison sentence of a year or longer to possess or transport a firearm). 
 29 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804; see Pro se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16 (defining 
pro se as “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; without a lawyer”). Dewberry sent the judge a written 
note requesting the removal of his public defender. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 3, United States 
v. Dewberry, 935 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied en banc, No. 17-1649, 2019 U.S. App. LEX-
IS 29626 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020) (No. 17-1649). The judge did not allow 
this change. Id. at 4. Dewberry’s public defender filed a Motion for Competency Determination to 
assess Dewberry’s mental acuity and, accordingly, his ability to undergo a trial. Id. Though medical 
professionals deemed Dewberry mentally sound and fit to stand trial, the psychologist conducting the 
examination noted that Dewberry was concerned about his disagreement with defense counsel’s ap-
praisal of the sentencing guideline ranges that pertained to his charge. Id. 
 30 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804; see Counsel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16 (defining 
standby counsel as “[a] lawyer appointed by the court to be prepared to represent a defendant who 
waives the right to counsel, so as to ensure both that the defendant receives a fair trial and that undue 
delays are avoided”). This change was brought about by Dewberry’s public defender, who submitted a 
motion to withdraw after Dewberry asked her to do so. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 
29, at 5. The attorney told the court that she felt as though her relationship with Dewberry had been 
eroded so severely that it could not be mended. Id. Specifically, the attorney felt that Dewberry’s 
refusal to engage in serious discussions with her about his case reflected a lack of trust in her. Id. 
Dewberry told the court that he could not afford to hire a new attorney but that he also could not con-
tinue to be represented by an attorney who would not respect his wishes. Id. As a result, Dewberry felt 
obliged to represent himself. Id. The judge then allowed Dewberry to proceed pro se and designated 
the public defender as Dewberry’s standby counsel should the case reach the trial stage. Id. at 7. 
 31 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804. Dewberry submitted a pro se motion to the court objecting to his 
own role as pro se head counsel. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 29, at 9. In this motion, 
Dewberry complained that ineffective counsel combined with the judge’s refusal to provide him with 
a new attorney had given him no choice but to represent himself. Id. As a result, Dewberry was forced 
to conduct his own defense with no understanding of the rules. Id. 
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provided public defender to return as his representative.32 Dewberry selected 
the first option, moving forward as his own representative.33 A few days prior 
to the agreed-upon trial date, the involved parties attended a pretrial confer-
ence during which the magistrate judge replaced Dewberry’s pro se representa-
tion with that of a public defender.34 Dewberry communicated his disagree-
ment with this adjustment.35 
Just prior to the trial’s slated commencement date, Dewberry decided to 
formally admit his guilt.36 The plea agreement that Dewberry signed included 
an appeal waiver stating that Dewberry relinquished his right to appeal a 
judgment of guilt.37 Dewberry’s public defender accompanied him to a hearing 
called to change Dewberry’s plea.38 After conducting a plea colloquy, the judge 
allowed Dewberry to plead guilty.39 Before doing so, however, the magistrate 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804. The court denied Dewberry’s motion on the grounds that his rejec-
tion of his initial counsel was without good cause. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 29, at 
9. 
 33 See Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804 (implying that Dewberry decided to represent himself because 
the court refused to replace his standby counsel with another). 
 34 Id. The court stated that its reasoning for reappointing the public defender was its worry that 
Dewberry would not, without guidance from counsel, be able to comprehend the plea agreement pro-
posed to him or any pre-trial preparations. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, supra note 29, at 14. 
 35 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804. Dewberry claimed that the public defender had asked him to lie 
about details of the crime, but the court did not believe those assertions to be true. Appellant’s Sup-
plemental Brief, supra note 29, at 12. Dewberry stated that he “didn’t want (his appointed counsel) 
from the beginning” and that he “can’t even defend (himself) now.” Id. The court replied: “you ha-
ven’t done any good at it yet, Mr. Dewberry.” Id. 
 36 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804. Dewberry pleaded to sixty months in prison. Id. The procedure for 
pleading guilty is traditionally begun by asking the defendant: “how do you plead: guilty or not guilty?” 
LESTER B. ORFIELD, ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 11:27 (2020). 
The defendant must respond with either “guilty” or “not guilty,” or the defendant may choose to say 
nothing at all. Id. The prosecution and the defense must present the plea on the record in court. FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2). 
 37 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804–05. The appeal waiver stated that Dewberry waived his right to 
appeal the guilty plea at any point in the future. Id. According to Rule 11(b)(N) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, it is the responsibility of the court to ensure that the defendant comprehends 
and assents to the terms of any plea agreement that waives future rights of appeal. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11. 
 38 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 805. This hearing resulted from Dewberry’s agreement during pre-trial 
proceedings to change his plea from “not guilty” to “guilty.” See id. at 804 (stating that Dewberry 
agreed to formally plead guilty after undergoing pre-trial proceedings). 
 39 Id. at 805. The plea colloquy was made pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Id. During the plea colloquy, the magistrate judge questioned Dewberry three times as to 
whether he had been pressured into accepting his plea, and he responded that he had not. Id. A plea 
colloquy is a discussion occurring in open court that is typically initiated immediately prior to the 
defendant formally pleading guilty, where the judge speaks with the defendant to ensure that the de-
fendant comprehends the effect of the plea. Plea colloquy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
16. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates that the court hold a colloquy to 
engage the defendant. ORFIELD, supra note 36, § 11:27. Rule 11 states that a judge is required to 
speak directly with the defendant prior to the defendant accepting any guilt-admitting or acquiescing 
plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. In doing so, the judge is required to ascertain the defendant’s comprehen-
II.-412 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
judge recited the appeal waiver aloud and asked Dewberry whether he com-
prehended it.40 Dewberry replied that he did.41 
Dewberry appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.42 Shortly thereafter, the public defender who had previously 
worked on Dewberry’s case submitted an Anders brief, arguing that the plea 
agreement to which Dewberry assented foreclosed the appeal.43 The public 
defender also claimed that Dewberry was deprived of his pro se right during 
the lower court proceedings.44 
The Eighth Circuit provided Dewberry with representation and requested 
that each side prepare arguments regarding (1) whether Dewberry’s guilty plea 
relinquished his right to challenge the denial of his right to proceed pro se, and 
(2) whether the lower court was justified in denying Dewberry’s request to pro-
ceed pro se.45 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit held that Dewberry did waive his 
right to appeal the lower court’s denial of his pro se right and, therefore, even if 
                                                                                                                           
sion of the various aspects of his plea. Id. These factors include the right of the government, in a per-
jury action, to use the defendants’ previous assertions under oath against them, the defendants’ ability 
to plead not guilty or to continue denying their guilt, the defendants’ right to be heard by a jury, the 
defendants’ rights to legal counsel at all times during their proceedings, the defendants’ trial rights to 
confront and question opposing witnesses, to be shielded from forced incrimination of themselves, to 
testify and admit evidence, and to produce witnesses, defendants’ relinquishment of all trial rights 
once the court accepts their guilty or nolo contendere pleas, the character of every charge that defend-
ants acquiesce to, and all maximum potential penalties. Id. 
 40 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 805. 
 41 Id. Dewberry received a sixty-month prison sentence under the plea agreement. Id. According to 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, Dewberry’s actions made him eligible for forty-
six to fifty-seven months in prison. Id. When a plea agreement is made such that the parties agree to a 
sentence of specified duration, as was the case in United States v. Dewberry, the court has the choice 
to allow the agreed-upon terms, disallow them, or suspend its judgment for reexamination after read-
ing through the defendant’s presentence report. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A); see 936 F.3d at 805 
(specifying that Dewberry and the government agreed that Dewberry would serve a sixty-month sen-
tence); Presentence Report, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16 (defining “presentence report” 
as a comprehensive description of the defendant’s personal history meant to assist the court in deter-
mining a sentence). Before the court may accept a proposed plea agreement, it is required to apprise 
the defendant that the agreed upon sentence will be a part of the judgment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4). 
The defendant is not able to rescind a guilty plea once the court has accepted the proposed plea 
agreement and executed the defendant’s sentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e). A plea of guilt can only be 
rescinded “on direct appeal or collateral attack” once the court has accepted it. Id.; see Collateral 
Attack, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16 (defining “collateral attack” as a challenge to a 
judgment that is not made on direct appeal). 
 42 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 805. 
 43 Id.; see Anders brief, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16 (defining an “Anders brief” as 
a brief that a court-designated public defender submits requesting to be removed from the case’s ap-
peal because of her opinion that the appeal is without merit). 
 44 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 805. 
 45 Id. The government acknowledged that Dewberry’s behavior did not justify the lower court’s 
denial of his pro se right but contended that Dewberry’s failure to unambiguously demand his pro se right 
upon the court’s questioning necessitated the court’s reassignment of representation. Id. Alternatively, the 
government argued that Dewberry waived his right to appeal when he pleaded guilty. Id. 
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the lower court was not justified in denying that right, Dewberry could not 
challenge the decision now.46 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ WAIVER  
OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
In 1976, in United States v. Montgomery, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit was the first federal circuit court to take up the issue of 
whether a criminal defendant who was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
proceed pro se at trial and then pleaded guilty could later challenge that denial 
on appeal.47 In the following years, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits also addressed the issue.48 Section A of this Part discusses the 
position that the majority of circuits took.49 Section B discusses the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s differing approach.50 Section C explains the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 
United States v. Dewberry, which adhered to the reasoning of the majority of 
circuit courts.51 
A. The U.S. Court of Appeals Majority View 
Most circuit courts to consider the issue of a defendant’s ability to chal-
lenge the denial of his pro se right after he has already pleaded guilty have held 
that such a defendant has waived the ability to later claim that the denial re-
sulted in an invalid guilty plea.52 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 807. 
 47 See United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1405 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that a de-
fendant who had pleaded guilty could not challenge the denial of his pro se right). 
 48 See Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a criminal defendant is pre-
cluded from challenging the denial of his pro se right after pleading guilty), reh’g denied en banc, No. 
10-2183, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23965 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 
266–68 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that the essential factor in resolving whether a defendant’s guilty plea was 
voluntary is the defendant’s ability to seek a remedy for any constitutional deficiencies on appeal); 
Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 941 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a defendant who pleads nolo contendere 
gives up his right to later claim that the lower court improperly denied his right to self-representation); 
Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1407 (articulating the notion that a defendant’s guilty plea, which he made to 
avoid a particularly severe sentence, is voluntary and precludes the defendant from challenging the 
denial of his pro se right). 
 49 See infra notes 52–77 and accompanying text (explaining the position of the majority of the 
circuit courts of appeals). 
 50 See infra notes 78–86 and accompanying text (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s position, which 
contradicted the holdings of the majority of circuit courts that had previously addressed the issue). 
 51 See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (explaining the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in hold-
ing that defendants who pleaded guilty may not challenge the constitutionality of the deprivation of 
their pro se rights). 
 52 See Werth, 692 F.3d at 488 (stating that a defendant cannot appeal the lower court’s denial of his 
Sixth Amendment right if he has already entered a guilty plea); Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 266–68 (holding 
that the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea turns on whether the defendant had the ability to appeal 
constitutional deprivations at trial); Gomez, 434 F.3d at 941 (stating that a plea of nolo contendere acts 
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For example, in 2010, in United States v. Moussaoui, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case in which the defendant plead-
ed guilty to several counts of criminal conspiracy after asserting his right to 
proceed pro se.53 Although the defendant in that case had standby counsel and a 
trusted Muslim attorney for guidance, he affirmed that he would represent him-
self in all court proceedings.54 The defendant’s standby counsel made attempts to 
speak with and provide assistance to him, but the defendant was vehement in his 
refusal of aid.55 At one point, the court annulled the defendant’s right to proceed 
pro se, and he entered an unconditional guilty plea shortly thereafter.56 
In challenging his guilty plea on appeal, the defendant claimed that he did 
not enter the plea voluntarily.57 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that ad-
                                                                                                                           
to foreclose a defendant from claiming that his Sixth Amendment right was unconstitutionally infringed); 
Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1407 (stating that a guilty plea is voluntary if it is motivated by a desire to 
avoid harsh penalties). 
 53 Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 266–68. The defendant was a French citizen who pleaded guilty to six 
criminal conspiracy counts connected to the al Qaeda terrorist attacks carried out on September 11, 
2001. Id. at 266. Officials had apprehended the defendant the month prior as a result of staying in the 
country past the expiration of his visa. Id. As a result, the government was holding the defendant in 
captivity at the time of the attacks. Id. In his request to proceed pro se, the defendant cited his appoint-
ed attorneys’ lack of comprehension of terrorism or Islam. Id. at 268. The defendant also accused the 
government of preventing him from having a Muslim attorney as his counsel, per his request. Id. The 
defendant was explicit about the fact that he did not want anyone to serve as his representative—the 
Muslim attorney would only help him with “witnesses and material necessary for his defense.” Id. 
 54 Id. at 268. After an examination of the defendant’s competency, the judge determined that the 
defendant had effectively relinquished his right to an attorney. Id. In spite of this, due to the compli-
cated nature of the case and the presence of classified information in discovery, the lower court de-
manded that the defendant retain standby counsel to assist him. Id.; see Counsel, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 16 (defining “standby counsel”). The defendant informed the court that he had 
met with a Muslim attorney who offered to represent him pro bono, but he continued to insist that he 
would represent himself. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 268; see Pro bono, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 16 (defining pro bono as “uncompensated”). As such, the defendant made it clear that his 
Muslim attorney would act as his representative outside of the proceedings, rather than his official 
representative. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 268. 
 55 Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 269–70. The court was forced to replace the defendant’s standby coun-
sel with another attorney after issues between the defendant and his original standby counsel could not 
be resolved. Id. at 269. The defendant pushed back against this change and tried to identify another 
Muslim attorney as his designated counsel. Id. The defendant asked that the judge release his court-
appointed attorney so that his Muslim attorney could enter the proceedings in the capacity of “legal 
consultant” or “advisor.” Id. The court did not allow this because the defendant’s requested attorney 
was not a member of the Virginia bar, among other reasons. Id. The defendant continued to resist the 
efforts of his court-appointed attorney to aid him, prompting the judge to inform the defendant that his 
resistance would only impair his outcome. Id. at 270. The defendant continued to berate the court for 
not providing him with the assistance he requested, stating that the court did not provide him with an 
adequate means of defending himself. Id. 
 56 Id. at 271. The court rescinded the defendant’s pro se status as a result of his submission of 
over twenty filings containing threats against members of the government and other foreign govern-
ments. Id. The defendant later admitted that he intended to spread propaganda about al Qaeda’s mis-
sion against the United States through these filings. Id. 
 57 Id. at 279. The defendant stated that his plea was involuntary because the district court denied 
him the right to select his own counsel, receive pretrial exposure to exculpatory evidence, confer with his 
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verse lower court evidentiary rulings did not make the defendant’s plea invol-
untary because he had the option of going to trial and rectifying these errors on 
appeal.58 The defendant additionally asserted that his plea was “unknowing 
and uncounseled” because the court prevented him from discussing exculpato-
ry evidence with defense counsel prior to its entrance, and the court also pre-
vented him from viewing the materials.59 The court rejected this claim as well, 
stating that these restrictions were not so burdensome as to constructively deny 
counsel during the entrance of his guilty plea, which is the standard for suc-
ceeding under this claim.60 
Similarly, in 2012, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case 
Werth v. Bell, the defendant challenged his guilty plea on the grounds that it 
was entered into as a result of duress because the district court did not allow 
                                                                                                                           
attorney about the evidence, represent himself sufficiently, attend crucial parts of the trial process, and 
present certain witnesses during the proceedings. Id. The defendant claimed that, like the defendant in 
the Ninth Circuit’s 2000 decision in United States v. Hernandez, his only choices were to plead guilty 
or submit to a constitutionally invalid trial. Id. at 280; see United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 
627 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a defendant who has been denied his pro se right is forced to either 
plead guilty or subject himself to a trial in which he would not have the benefit of all his constitutional 
rights), overruled on other grounds by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 58 See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280. The Fourth Circuit expressed its disagreement with the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Hernandez, stating that it was based on the misguided belief that the defendant’s 
only other option would have been to undergo an unconstitutional trial. Id. The Fourth Circuit pointed 
out that the Ninth Circuit did not consider the fact that the defendant could have sought an appeal had 
he underwent trial and been convicted. Id. As such, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the defendant’s guilty 
plea had the effect of relinquishing the ability to challenge all deficiencies not pertaining to jurisdic-
tion prior to his conviction, aside from those deficiencies that touch on the sufficiency of the defend-
ant’s plea. Id. 
 59 Id. at 281; see Exculpatory Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16 (defining 
“exculpatory evidence” as evidence that supports a defendant’s guiltlessness). The defendant com-
plained that a protective order issued under the Classified Information Procedures Act gave the prose-
cution the ability to prevent him from viewing exculpatory material. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 285; see 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (limiting the unwarranted disclosure of classified information). The defendant 
claimed that there were several people whose statements would have proven that he had not been set 
to take part in the attacks of September 11th but rather that he was set to take part in a second group of 
attacks that were never realized. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 285. The defendant believed that this infor-
mation would have proved his innocence because it would have demonstrated that he did not take part 
in the September 11th terrorist attacks that served as the basis of the charge against him. Id. The de-
fendant claimed that the source of his right to view the material was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1963 
holding in Brady v. Maryland. Id.; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to view pertinent evidence beneficial to his defense), habeas pro-
ceeding sub nom. at Brady v. Superintendent, Anne Arundel Cnty. Det. Ctr., 314 F. Supp. 799 (D. 
Md. 1970), aff’d, 443 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 60 Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 289. The court rejected the defendant’s Brady claim because the court 
classified the right to exculpatory evidence as a trial right. Id. at 285. The Brady right was designed to 
ensure justice in trial verdicts and to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions. Id. This risk of 
error is not concerning when defendants plead guilty because they have admitted, of their own volition 
and in open court, that they committed the crime. Id. 
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him to represent himself.61 The defendant argued that the court’s interference 
with his pro se right immediately affected his choice to enter a guilty plea, and, 
thus, it was not made “voluntarily and intelligently.”62 Although the court ad-
mitted that reasonable minds could differ on this question, it ultimately disa-
greed with the defendant and declined to address whether a Sixth Amendment 
denial can render a guilty plea involuntary.63 
Additionally, in 2006, in Gomez v. Berge, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant relinquished the ability to challenge 
constitutional defects that took place during his trial when he pleaded nolo 
contendere.64 The defendant claimed that the district court had erred in deny-
                                                                                                                           
 61 Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied en banc, No. 10-2183, 2012 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 23965 (6th Cir. 2012). After robbing a convenience store, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
“breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny,” as well as “possession of burglar’s tools.” Id. The 
defendant demanded that the court respect his pro se right at least seven times prior to pleading guilty. Id. 
The court denied the first six demands in succession. Id. Upon the defendant’s seventh request for self-
representation, the district court judge explained to the defendant the charges that had been brought 
against him, informed him that the court would provide him with no additional guidance regarding the 
proceedings against him, and rejected his entreaty before allowing him to respond. Id. Prior to the en-
trance of his guilty plea, the defendant participated in a plea colloquy during which the judge told the 
defendant that a guilty plea serves to relinquish many constitutional rights. Id. at 490. The judge also 
informed the defendant that he could not later assert that the plea resulted from coercion not in the record 
at the time. Id. The judge later disallowed the defendant’s attempt to revoke his plea, which the defendant 
asserted had resulted from duress due to the court’s denial of his pro se right. Id. at 488. On appeal, the 
defendant first argued that the waiver analysis set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Tollett v. 
Henderson had no bearing on his case because the violation of his rights was continuous. Id. at 496. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Tollett stated that a plea of guilty acts as an interruption in the sequence of events 
that came before it. 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973); see Werth, 692 F.3d at 495. As such, a criminal defendant 
who has accepted responsibility for the crime may not later bring independent claims pertaining to any 
constitutional defects that took place before making the guilty plea. Werth, 692 F.3d at 495. Ultimately, 
the Sixth Circuit did not accept this argument because it found no Supreme Court precedent to support 
such an exception. Id. at 496. The court opined that, even if the defendant had been able to point to Su-
preme Court precedent establishing an exception to the rule in Tollett, he nonetheless would not have 
prevailed due to the facts of his case. Id. at 496–97. Specifically, the lower court had disallowed the de-
fendant’s motion to proceed pro se a full two days prior to the defendant’s plea, so the alleged violation of 
his pro se right had already taken place when he entered this plea. Id. at 497. The court stated that, even if 
the Sixth Amendment denial were continuous, such that the constitutional violation outlasted the plea’s 
entrance, the issue of the plea’s finality would be rendered moot. See id. (stating that the effect of the 
Sixth Amendment violation, rather than the violation itself, was continuous, foreclosing the defendant’s 
argument that the violation had precluded the finality of the guilty plea). 
 62 Werth, 692 F.3d at 497. The defendant asserted that these circumstances could not result in a valid 
relinquishment of his rights according to Tollett. Id. 
 63 Id. The court stated that it did not need to enter the debate about whether a plea can be volun-
tary and intelligent if the denial of a defendant’s right to represent himself contributed to his decision 
to plead guilty. Id. The court cited the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Harrington v. Richter for the 
proposition that a state court’s judgment that a claim forecloses a defendant from federal habeas relief 
if “fairminded jurists could disagree” about the propriety of the decision. Id. at 495; see Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (stating that federal habeas relief is not available to litigants in state 
court where judges may differ in their views of the appropriateness of the state court’s actions). 
 64 Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 941 (7th Cir. 2006). In 2006, the Seventh Circuit in Gomez v. 
Berge followed the Sixth Circuit’s 2012 approach in Werth v. Bell when it gave deference to the standard 
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ing his right to represent himself, and, as such, the plea entered on his behalf 
was not voluntary.65 Like the other circuits to have considered the issue, the 
Seventh Circuit held that both a guilty plea and a no contest plea foreclose the 
defendant from later raising constitutional issues pertaining to the proceedings 
before the plea was made.66 According to the Seventh Circuit, that foreclosure 
includes challenges regarding the lower court’s judgment that the defendant 
was not properly suited to proceed pro se at trial.67 
Finally, in 1976, in Montgomery, the Tenth Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion.68 There, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault after requesting that 
the court appoint him another attorney who was not associated with the federal 
government.69 The district court denied his request, and, shortly thereafter, the 
defendant asked to represent himself in the proceedings instead.70 The court 
denied this request as well.71 On appeal, the defendant argued that the lower 
court violated his right to proceed pro se, as affirmed in the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Faretta v. California.72 The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim, clari-
                                                                                                                           
of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act––only defendants who prove that 
the lower court proceedings allowed for a decision that was in opposition to federal law as the U.S. Su-
preme Court set forth are entitled to federal habeas relief. Id. at 942. 
 65 Id. at 942. 
 66 Id. at 942–43. The court cited to Brady v. United States for the proposition that a guilty plea relin-
quishes the defendant’s right to later contest the validity of the statute that served as a basis for the in-
dictment. Id. at 942; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970) (affirming the lower court’s 
decision to preclude relief because the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary). The court stated 
unequivocally that an unconditional guilty plea acts as a forfeiture of all formal errors in the proceedings, 
including constitutional deficiencies that took place prior to the entrance of the plea. Gomez, 434 F.3d at 
942. According to the Seventh Circuit, the waiver principle extends to pleas of no contest because they 
have the effect of impliedly admitting that all of the allegations made against the defendant are true. Id. 
 67 Gomez, 434 F.3d at 942. Although the court conceded that guilty pleas do not automatically 
preclude constitutional challenges, such as double jeopardy claims, those regarding the constitutionali-
ty of the proceedings leading to the defendant’s plea do. Id. at 943. 
 68 See United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that a guilty 
plea forecloses constitutional challenges that pertain to the sufficiency of the proceedings that oc-
curred between a defendant’s indictment and plea). 
 69 Id. at 1405. Prosecutors charged the defendant with assault against a correctional officer and 
carrying a weapon at a federal penitentiary where the defendant was serving another sentence. Id. The 
court assigned the defendant a public defender to represent him in the proceedings. Id. The public 
defender was present at the defendant’s arraignment, but the defendant informed the judge at that time 
that he wished to be assigned another, private attorney. Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. The defendant had a ten-day window after the court rejected his application for self-
representation during which he was permitted to initiate motions necessary to his defense. Id. The 
defendant filed two pro se motions requesting a polygraph and any evidence that had the potential to 
strengthen his case. Id. 
 72 Id. at 1406. In 1975, in Faretta v. California, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant 
has a constitutional right to proceed pro se so long as he requests to do so in a voluntary and intelli-
gent manner. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). Under these circumstances, a state cannot require a defendant 
to use appointed counsel when the defendant wants to represent himself. Id. 
II.-418 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
fying that only state courts can apply the Faretta Court’s holding.73 Neverthe-
less, the court acknowledged that the right to represent oneself in a federal 
court proceeding is firmly established and that a defendant is allowed to bring 
forth claims that the lower court infringed this right.74 The court concluded, 
however, that the lower court had not violated this established right.75 Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that because the defendant pleaded guilty to se-
cure a less harsh penalty, his plea was voluntary.76 This guilty plea, made of 
the defendant’s own volition, served as a superseding force that closed the door 
on an examination of any constitutional defects in the preceding process.77 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Departure from the U.S. Court  
of Appeals Homogeny 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is the only federal court 
of appeals to depart from the holding that a criminal defendant who was denied 
his pro se right cannot later appeal an adverse decision.78 In 2000, in United 
States v. Hernandez, the defendant pleaded guilty to “illegal reentry” and later 
challenged his conviction on the premise that the district court had improperly 
denied his request to represent himself, infringing upon his constitutional right 
to self-representation.79 In particular, the defendant challenged the notion that 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406. The court stated that the Faretta ruling entitled defendants to 
self-representation inherent in state prosecutions. Id. That decision, the Tenth Circuit opined, does not 
extend to prosecutions in federal court. See id. (stating that the federal right to self-representation is 
already codified in federal law). 
 74 Id. The right to represent oneself is based in the Judiciary Act of 1789, written into present-day 
federal law as 28 U.S.C. § 1654. 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406. The Tenth Circuit 
stated that, because federal courts have respected the right to represent oneself since the passage of the 
Judiciary Act, the defendant could assert it irrespective of the Faretta ruling’s ability to apply retro-
spectively. Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406. 
 75 See Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406 (explaining that the defendant approved his court-appointed 
counsel to engage in plea bargaining, which the court recognized as an acquiescence to the use of counsel 
and an abandonment of the defendant’s attempt to represent himself). 
 76 Id. at 1406–07. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant did not renew his assertions of 
the right to proceed pro se during the plea bargaining and plea colloquy phases of the proceedings. Id. 
at 1406. The court also noted that the lower court judge was painstaking in his dialogue with the de-
fendant to ensure that he understood the consequences of his plea. Id. 
 77 Id. at 1407. The court further opined that allowing the defendant to raise constitutional chal-
lenges later would invite future defendants to maneuver the judicial system in an underhanded man-
ner, which the court sought to discourage. Id. The court appeared to endorse the view that the immoral 
craftsmanship it condemned had been at play in the case at hand. See id. (stating that dishonest ma-
neuvering seemed to have played a part in the appeal). 
 78 See United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 627 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant 
who has requested to proceed pro se in a manner that is punctual, not made to stall the proceedings, 
and “unequivocal, as well as voluntary and intelligent” must be allowed to do so), overruled on other 
grounds by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 79 Id. at 617–18. The defendant was removed from the United States in 1992 and in 1994 after 
being charged with “various drug-related felonies and assault with a deadly weapon.” Id. at 617. Three 
years later, in 1997, authorities discovered and subsequently arrested the defendant in California. Id. 
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his plea was voluntarily entered, postulating that the court had essentially co-
erced him to plead guilty by rejecting his self-representation right.80 The Ninth 
Circuit held that, so long as a defendant’s invocation of the right to represent 
himself is (1) made in a well-timed manner, (2) not intended to stall the pro-
ceedings, and (3) “unequivocal, as well as voluntary and intelligent,” the de-
fendant must be allowed to represent himself.81 The Ninth Circuit went on to 
conclude that the defendant’s entreaty was punctual, not for the purpose of de-
laying the proceedings, unambiguous, voluntary, and intelligent.82 As such, the 
court concluded that the lower court erroneously denied the defendant’s re-
quest to represent himself.83 The court reasoned that, if the improper denial of 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right created excessive pressure on the de-
fendant’s ability to plead guilty, then it would have the effect of invalidating 
                                                                                                                           
Prosecutors charged the defendant with illegal reentry in transgression of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Id. After a 
pretrial status conference, the defendant was displeased with his counsel’s performance and asked for 
new representation. Id. The lower court judge refused to appoint new counsel. Id. As a result, the 
defendant informed the court that he wished to proceed pro se. Id. The judge warned that it was an ill-
advised decision, given that the defendant was not fluent in English and was not a lawyer. Id. The 
judge also attempted to ascertain the defendant’s capacity to represent himself. Id. at 617–18. As a 
result of an apparent deficiency in the defendant’s ability to answer the judge’s queries, such as 
“[w]hat does the government have to prove to convict you of this offense?,” the court denied the de-
fendant his pro se right. Id. at 618. Shortly thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty. Id. Throughout the 
sentencing process, the defendant renewed his opposition to his counsel and continued to ask the 
judge to provide him with new representation. Id. He did not, however, repeat his earlier entreaty to 
proceed pro se. Id. 
 80 Id. at 619–20. The defendant argued that his guilty plea was coerced because he was forced to 
plead guilty so that he could forego being put through a trial that would have deprived him of his 
constitutional rights and prevented him from representing himself. Id. The court stated that, for the 
defendant to prove that his plea was not made in a voluntary manner, he had to demonstrate that (1) 
the lower infringed on his Sixth Amendment right by denying his entreaty to proceed pro se, and (2) 
that the court made his plea involuntary by providing him with the option to either proceed with an 
unconstitutional trial or plead guilty. Id. 
 81 Id. at 620. 
 82 Id. at 621–26. The court noted that the defendant asked to represent himself well before the 
trial was set to begin, thereby making his requirement timely. Id. at 621. The court also determined 
that the defendant’s assertion of his pro se right was unequivocal because it was genuine and made in 
a manner that reflected that the defendant was not undergoing an “emotional outburst.” Id. The court 
was particularly moved by the defendant’s statement to the judge that, if the judge could not assign 
him a new attorney, the defendant wanted to represent himself with the assistance of an interpreter. Id. 
Moreover, the court stated that a request for self-representation is voluntary and intelligent when it is 
informed by the content of the accusations raised against the defendant, the potential punishments, and 
the possible pitfalls of proceeding pro se. Id. at 623–24. The court concluded that the defendant’s right 
to proceed pro se had been infringed due to the fact that the lower court judge did not try to educate 
the defendant about any of these factors. Id. at 625. Instead, the lower court judge tried to test the 
defendant’s awareness of those elements and then declined to engage with the defendant based on his 
lack of knowledge about them. Id. at 625–26. 
 83 Id. at 626. 
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that plea as involuntary.84 Because the defendant was faced with a choice of 
pleading guilty or yielding to a trial in which the court had stripped him of his 
Sixth Amendment right, the court reasoned that this denial created excessive 
pressure on the defendant’s choice.85 Because the defendant’s plea was not 
voluntarily entered, the Ninth Circuit vacated it.86 
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Adherence to the Majority Rule 
In 2019, in United States v. Dewberry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit sided with the majority of circuits, holding that a defendant who 
pleaded guilty during pre-trial proceedings is foreclosed from later challenging 
the constitutionality of the court’s denial of his Sixth Amendment right.87 After 
assessing the approach that each of the circuit courts to have already addressed 
the issue applied, the Eighth Circuit expressed agreement with the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s determination that defendants may find recourse to address any pre-trial 
constitutional deprivations on appeal.88 As a result, it is not true that defend-
ants who have faced these deprivations are left with only two options: plead 
guilty or submit to a trial marred by constitutional defects. 89 The Eighth Cir-
cuit also pointed out that defendants seeking to maintain appellate remedies 
may enter conditional guilty pleas, a tool that Dewberry did not utilize.90 The 
court stated that Dewberry needed to have alleged specific facts to demonstrate 
that his plea was involuntary.91 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that violations of 
pro se rights do not render guilty pleas involuntary per se.92 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. Because the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court improperly denied the defendant 
his self-representation right, it automatically concluded that the defendant’s plea was rendered invol-
untary. Id. at 626–27. 
 85 Id. at 626–27. A defendant must be given the choice between pleading guilty and submitting to 
a trial that is consistent with the rights the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants. Id. The court 
analogized the facts of this case to a defendant being forced to plead guilty or undergo a trial without 
the advice of an attorney or under the leadership of a judge afflicted by prejudice. Id. In the case at 
bar, as in each of the examples provided, the judge did not offer the defendant the lawful alternatives 
to pleading guilty that the Constitution demands and, therefore, the defendant did not enter his plea 
voluntarily. Id. 
 86 Id. at 627. 
 87 United States v. Dewberry, 936 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied en banc, No. 17-
1649, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29626 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020). 
 88 Id. at 806. The Eighth Circuit stated its belief that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Hernandez 
was based on the misguided notion that defendants who are forced to choose between pleading guilty 
and undergoing a trial in which they are not afforded all of their constitutional rights renders the plea 
involuntary. Id. The Eighth Circuit explained that any constitutional deprivations would have the 
opportunity to be righted during appellate proceedings. Id. at 806–07. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 807. Prior to entering a conditional guilty plea, defendants have the option of stating in 
writing that they wish to preserve their right to appellate review of any pretrial rulings that they did 
not agree with. Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH WAS PREFERABLE TO THAT OF  
ITS SISTER CIRCUITS BECAUSE IT EXPANDS THE RIGHTS  
OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
The implicit concerns of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits are that criminal defendants will attempt to use the appellate court sys-
tem for improper or self-serving means.93 Although these concerns are valid 
and not without cause, they have led these courts to overly restrict the rights of 
criminal defendants.94 The Ninth Circuit’s approach, on the other hand, has 
properly prioritized a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation.95 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See United States v. Dewberry, 936 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that a criminal de-
fendant who was denied his pro se right during pre-trial proceedings cannot challenge that denial after 
pleading guilty), reh’g denied en banc, No. 17-1649, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29626 (8th Cir. 2019), 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020); Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that, by 
entering a plea of guilty, a criminal defendant’s ability to challenge the denial of his pro se right is fore-
closed), reh’g denied en banc, No. 10-2183, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23965 (6th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 266–68 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that a defendant’s plea is voluntary, and 
thus valid, so long as the defendant had the option of proceeding to trial to rectify any improper denial of 
rights); Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940, 941 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a defendant who pleads nolo 
contendere relinquishes his right to later claim that the lower court improperly denied his pro se right); 
United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that a defendant who pleads 
guilty to secure a more favorable sentence and avoid harsh penalties does so in a voluntary manner, and, 
as a result, the defendant cannot later challenge the denial of his right to self-representation). In 1976, 
in United States v. Montgomery, for example, the Tenth Circuit articulated a fear that, should courts 
allow defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the denial of their pro se rights, defendants 
would abuse that right and use it as a means of instituting frivolous appeals. 529 F.2d at 1407. 
 94 See Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 805 (stating that criminal defendants are precluded from challeng-
ing the denial of their pro se rights after they have pleaded guilty); Werth, 692 F.3d at 497 (rejecting 
the defendant’s argument that his plea was not voluntary because the court improperly denied him his pro 
se right); Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280 (holding that defendants’ pleas are not involuntary when de-
fendants are provided an opportunity to rectify constitutional defects on appeal); Gomez, 434 F.3d at 
943 (declining to take up the question of whether a guilty plea may be rendered involuntary as a result of 
prior constitutional deprivations); Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406–07 (holding that a guilty plea was 
voluntary because the defendant who agreed to its terms sought to secure for himself a more favorable 
outcome). 
 95 See United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 614, 627 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that criminal defend-
ants’ Sixth Amendment rights have been violated when requests to represent themselves are improperly 
denied and that this denial has the effect of rendering the defendants’ pleas involuntary), overruled on 
other grounds by Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). Whereas most of the circuit courts held 
that a plea is knowing and voluntary so long as the defendant understands the consequences of his 
plea and is informed of the nature of the charges brought against him, the Ninth Circuit chose to de-
fine knowing and voluntary as informed by a defendant’s request for self-representation. Id. at 620. In 
other words, so long as a defendant’s invocation of the right to represent himself is made in a well-timed 
manner, is not made to stall the proceedings, and is also “unequivocal, as well as voluntary and intelli-
gent,” the defendant must be allowed to represent himself in the Ninth Circuit. Id. This allows for greater 
leniency in the granting of criminal appeals, as it sets a much lower hurdle for defendants to clear. See id. 
(stating that defendants must be allowed to represent themselves whenever they meet the requirements 
set forth). Due process is a right set forth in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it 
can be characterized as either substantive or procedural. C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1820 (2020); IVAN 
E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS 
LIABILITY § 1:18 (2020). To determine whether there is a procedural due process issue, courts must un-
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The key piece of disagreement among the circuit courts is the extent to 
which courts should examine whether a guilty plea is voluntary and intelli-
gent.96 The majority of circuits were quick to foreclose an inquiry into whether 
a defendant’s plea could be anything but knowing and voluntary.97 Those 
courts instead began with the presumption that defendants entering guilty 
pleas, absent evidence of overt coercion, do so of their own volition.98 In con-
trast, the Ninth Circuit examined much more closely the connection between 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right and the voluntariness of his plea.99 In 
drawing a bright line rule that a defendant can challenge the denial of his Sixth 
Amendment right unless he did not make the request in a timely, unequivocal, 
voluntary, and intelligent manner, the Ninth Circuit stepped up to affirm crimi-
nal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.100 Once the court established that the 
lower court had infringed the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, it had little 
tolerance for the argument that the defendant’s guilty plea foreclosed his con-
                                                                                                                           
dertake a two-pronged examination––courts should first ascertain the existence of a “protected liberty or 
property interest,” and then determine the procedures that liberty demands. BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, 
supra, § 1:18. In 1976, in Matthews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court listed three factors that courts should 
weigh when resolving the second prong: (1) a defendant’s private interest, (2) the danger of this interest 
being improperly curtailed in the proceedings and the likely benefit of any added protections, and (3) the 
government’s interest in economic, administrative, and judicial efficiency. See 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 
(1976) (stating that constitutional due process requirements demand an analysis of three elements). As 
such, courts will make determinations of whether due process issues have arisen on the merits of each 
individual case. BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra, § 1:18. 
 96 Compare Gomez, 434 F.3d at 941 (stating that a defendant relinquishes his ability to challenge 
any constitutional defects in the proceedings against him when he pleads nolo contendere), with Hernan-
dez, 203 F.3d at 626–27 (stating that a defendant can challenge the validity of his guilty plea when the 
defendant can show that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent). 
 97 See Werth, 692 F.3d at 497 (stating that it is unclear whether a guilty plea may be considered 
involuntary and, as a result, void if the court did not afford the defendant his complete pro se right); 
Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280 (holding that guilty pleas are presumed valid because defendants have the 
option of seeking recourse for any constitutional violations at trial on appeal); Gomez, 434 F.3d at 943 
(stating that the defendant’s waiver of rights is final and unconditional); Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406–
07 (articulating the notion that a plea is voluntary when it is made in furtherance of the defendant’s 
self-interest, including obtaining a more favorable sentence). 
 98 See Werth, 692 F.3d at 497 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that Sixth Amendment depriva-
tions automatically result in the guilty plea becoming involuntary); Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 280 (holding 
that defendants’ ability to address pre-trial constitutional deprivations on appeal precludes their guilty 
pleas from being deemed involuntary); Gomez, 434 F.3d at 943 (failing to address the relationship be-
tween a guilty plea entered after a defendant’s pro se right was curtailed and the voluntariness of the 
plea); Montgomery, 529 F.2d at 1406–07 (stating that, after assessing the lower court’s record, it was 
evident that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily because the defendant did not renew his Sixth 
Amendment assertions and sought to agree on a less severe punishment). 
 99 See Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 627 (stating that the lower court’s removal of a fair trial from the 
defendant’s choices created unreasonable restrictions on the defendant’s ability to decide his fate and, 
as a result, rendered his plea involuntary). 
 100 See id. at 620, 623–25 (reasoning that courts must afford defendants their pro se rights so long 
as they meet the enumerated requirements). 
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stitutional challenge.101 Instead, the court held that the defendant’s guilty plea 
could not possibly have been voluntary.102 As such, the Ninth Circuit properly 
demonstrated its commitment to protecting criminal defendants’ pro se 
rights.103 
If the Ninth Circuit’s approach had been applied in Dewberry, the defend-
ant likely would have received a much more favorable outcome.104 Dewberry 
expressed several times that he preferred to represent himself.105 Because his 
requests were timely, unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent, the Eighth Cir-
cuit would have allowed Dewberry to proceed pro se under the Ninth Circuit’s 
test.106 Although this change may not have resulted in Dewberry being acquit-
ted of the crimes he was charged with, it would have protected his Sixth 
Amendment right and ensured that he received a fair adjudication.107 
CONCLUSION 
In 2019, in United States v. Dewberry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that a criminal defendant denied his Sixth Amendment 
right in the lower court could not later attack the constitutionality of that denial 
as having rendered his guilty plea unknowing or involuntary. This decision, 
like that of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, was misguided and 
unduly limited the rights of criminal defendants. These courts adopted a nar-
row view of the constitutional requirements of guilty pleas, determining that 
these requirements are satisfied so long as a defendant is not coerced into the 
plea. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding is preferable. This approach takes a 
more expansive view of the Sixth Amendment right and holds that the underly-
ing constitutional requirements for a guilty plea cannot be met when a defend-
ant’s pro se right is denied in spite of being made in a timely, unequivocal, 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Id. at 626. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. at 627 (holding that defendants do not have a fair choice when their only options are to 
plead guilty or submit to a trial that does not respect their Sixth Amendment rights); Baradaran, supra 
note 1, at 724 (reaffirming the essential character of the presumption of innocence to the criminal 
justice system). 
 104 United States v. Dewberry, 936 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that the defendant 
waived his right to challenge the lower court proceedings when he pleaded guilty to the charges 
against him, reh’g denied en banc, No. 17-1649, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29626 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2827 (2020); Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 627 (stating that trial courts may not place 
unnecessary restrictions on defendants’ self-representation rights). 
 105 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804. 
 106 See id. (failing to note any errors in the defendant’s pro se requests to the court); Hernandez, 
203 F.3d at 620–21 (stating that courts may not interfere with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
when he has requested to proceed pro se in a manner that is punctual, unambiguous, and self-willed 
and when he is aware of the circumstances). 
 107 Dewberry, 936 F.3d at 804 (stating that the defendant acknowledged his waiver of rights in 
pleading guilty). 
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voluntary, and intelligent manner. Other courts should adopt this approach to 
protect the Constitution’s guarantee of self-representation. 
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